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THE BALKANIZATION OF CAT PROPERTY 
INSURANCE: FINANCING AND 
FRAGMENTATION IN STORM RISKS  
 
Donald T. Hornstein1 
  
After a catastrophic weather event (“CAT”), such as a 
hurricane, there inevitably arise disputes over the cause of 
property damage, with losses attributable to flooding assigned to 
policies issued under the National Flood Insurance Program, 
and losses attributable to wind assigned to policies issued by 
private insurers and/or by various state-based residual risk 
pools.  Despite the fact that this “wind versus water” allocation 
has been occurring for almost half a century, it is still used as a 
symbol of arbitrariness and dysfunction in society’s ability to 
deploy insurance in situations where it is most needed.  Often, it 
is the point of contrast between the fragmented American 
approach to CAT property losses and more unified approaches 
found in the “code des assurances” in France (mandatory 
disaster coverage),2 coverage for bundled natural-disaster losses 
                                                   
1 Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of 
Law, and Member, Board of Directors, North Carolina Wind Pool.  All of the 
views expressed in this paper are attributable to me solely in my capacity as a 
law professor.  None of these views are intended to represent the views of the 
North Carolina Wind Pool or the North Carolina FAIR Plan, or even my own 
views when serving in my capacity as a member (and alternate member) of 
those institutions.  Special thanks to Rory Fleming, UNC Law School Class of 
2015, for invaluable research assistance.   
 
2 See Michel Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moreteau, France, in 
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
APPROACH 81, 85-90 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (overview of 
French CAT insurance).   
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adopted in Belgium between 2003-2005,3 and the California 
approach to earthquake coverage adopted in 1994 in the 
aftermath of the Northridge earthquake.4  
This Article surveys recent developments in the ongoing 
American debate over the fragmentation, and possible 
integration, of CAT property insurance, focusing on storm-
related CATs.  In most respects, for those who decry 
fragmentation of coverage, it’s all bad news.  Not only is there no 
visible political momentum behind proposals for national 
catastrophe insurance,5 but the wind-water dividing line is 
further fractured by doctrinal differences among jurisdictions 
over concurrent cause,6 by the increasing tendency among 
private wind carriers and state wind pools to expand deductibles 
and reduce policy limits,7 and by recent legislative changes in 
                                                   
3 See Isabelle Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES, supra note 2, at 66-69 (key provisions of the Belgian Act of 21 
May 2003). 
 
4 See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance 
Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for 
Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 185, 196 (2012) (“In 
California, the [California Earthquake Authority] . . . assumes primary 
responsibility for bearing earthquake risk . . .”).   
 
5 See Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of 
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 
875 (2006) (noting that, despite several bills having been introduced in 
Congress in 2006 to address lack of catastrophe insurance, “to date, except for 
the creation of the national flood insurance program in 1968, the federal 
government has not intervened in insurance markets to enhance coverage 
availability for victims of natural disasters.”).   
 
6 See, e.g., Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the 
Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: 
Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“Identical classes of loss 
following an event such as Hurricane Katrina may be covered by insurance in 
one state, but excluded in another—solely because of varying enforcement of 
standardized insurance policy exclusions.”).   
 
7 See EVAN MILLS ET AL., AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF INSURANCE 
UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES 5 
(2005).   
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Summer 2012 to the National Flood Insurance Program 
(“NFIP”) that created varying subcategories of coverage.8   
To be sure, against this evidence of disintegration of CAT 
storm insurance in the short term, there is some evidence of 
counter-trends that could lead to re-integration in the future.  
First, there are signs that CAT storm insurance is maturing 
financially.  In 2012, Congress abandoned the idea that flood 
insurance should be marketed at below-actuarially-fair prices; a 
policy shift reflecting in part Congress’ sticker-shock, after 
Hurricane Katrina, at being forced to bail out the NFIP’s 
actuarially unsound book of business (a policy shift surely 
reaffirmed after another congressional appropriation became 
necessary following Superstorm Sandy).9  As publicly subsidized 
CAT storm insurance becomes right-priced, it increases the 
possibility of private carriers reentering the market, especially to 
the extent that they might be able to externalize some of their 
risks onto global reinsurance- or equity markets.10   This raises 
the prospect that the insurance industry might, after all, be 
capable financially of insuring correlated CAT risks.  And, to the 
extent this occurs, it undermines the central rationale for 
fragmenting CAT storm risks in the first place –– to avoid risks 
that were considered by private carriers to be financially 
                                                   
8 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-607, FLOOD INSURANCE, 
MORE INFORMATION NEEDED ON SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 13 (2013) (noting the 
phasing out of subsidized rates for non-primary residences, severe repetitive 
loss properties, and business properties, among others).  
  
9 See Arthur D. Postal, As NFIP Faces Deepening Debt, Some Call for More 
Subsidies and Lower Rates, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/03/25/as-nfip-faces-deepening-
debt-some-call-for-more-su (“The result of the subsidies . . .  has been nothing 
but environmental catastrophe and financial ruin . . . the NFIP is flat broke, and 
has been ever since 2005, when Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma forced 
it[sic] borrow more than $19 billion from the U.S. Treasury just to pay its 
claims.”) (internal quotes omitted); see also James Rowley, Sandy Aid Runs 
Into Republican Demands for Spending Cuts, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-11/sandy-aid-runs-into-republican-
demands-for-spending-cuts.html.  
  
10 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y AND RES., 
BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2012 5 
(2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_overview_2012_flood_reauthorization.
pdf  (reinsurance/privatization initiatives). 
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uninsurable at rates property owners were willing to pay given 
the alternative of cheap(er) federal coverage.     
The second trend involves the possibility of greater 
coordination between risk mitigation measures and CAT risk 
insurance, coordination that could improve the risk landscape 
for which CAT insurance is sought.  To some extent, we can 
expect some risk mitigation measures to be more widely 
implemented in response to rising rates: fewer properties 
located within especially flood-prone areas, other properties 
better designed, and properties built to withstand storms.  
Indeed, signs of this have become evident in New Jersey 
communities starting to rebuild after Superstorm Sandy, as 
properties re-classified as risky by new FEMA flood maps seek 
out financing for protective design features that will lower their 
insurance bills.11  But, there are also signs of broader political 
conversations beginning to take place about protective measures 
that can be taken, and financed by, political bodies – ranging 
from changes in zoning laws to community resiliency planning 
to the construction of artificial wetlands and hardened storm 
barriers.12  As governments deploy their police powers and 
public-finance assets to address CAT risks, it improves the risk 
landscape for which private CAT insurance is sought, 
contributing to improvements in affordability and market 
penetration, and perhaps reducing the weight borne in CAT 
storm policies by provisions designed to reduce risk mostly by 
fragmenting it.  
                                                   
11 See N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., FACT SHEET: REBUILDING AFTER SANDY 
(2013), available at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/special/hurricane-
sandy/docs/rebuilding-after-sandy-factsheet.pdf (“Under a recently adopted 
DEP rule, you are required to elevate and/or meet new construction standards if 
your house is located in a flood zone and was declared substantially damaged by 
your local floodplain administrator . . . .”).   
 
12 See, e.g., Henry Goldman, Bloomberg Proposes $20 Billion NYC Flood 
Plan After Sandy, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-11/bloomberg-proposes-20-
billion-new-york-flood-plan-after-sandy.html (“[T]he mayor made 250 
recommendations, including installing bulkheads and dune systems on beach 
areas of Staten Island and the Rockaways in Queens . . . .”).  
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I.  THE EMERGENCE OF FRAGMENTED CAT 
STORM COVERAGE 
Most property insurance, as to dwellings and structures, 
provide “all-risk” coverage, meaning that direct physical losses 
are covered unless they fall within a particular exclusion.13  As a 
general proposition, causation drives coverage, as losses caused 
by certain events can be, and are, excluded.  It bears mentioning 
that, in all-risk policies, the insured bears the burden of proving 
that a covered loss has occurred, but thereafter the burden shifts 
to the insurer to prove that the loss is excluded.14  It is common 
for standard homeowner policies to exclude any loss to 
dwellings and structures resulting “from flood, surface water, 
waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body of water, spray from 
these, whether or not driven by wind.”15 
A.  THE FLOOD EXCLUSION IN PRIVATE COVERAGE AND 
CREATION OF THE NFIP 
The “water” or “flood” exclusions became standard in 
private, all-risk property insurance when the NFIP was created 
                                                   
13 5 MARC J. SHRAKE, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 44.02 
(2d ed. Supp. 2013) (“Under an ‘all risk’ property insurance policy, losses to 
covered property caused by any and all perils, or risks, are covered, unless the 
loss is caused by a peril that is expressly and unambiguously excluded by the 
policy.”).   
 
14 1 MITCHELL L. LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLAIMS § 4.03 (2d ed. Supp. 2012) (“Under the all risk policy, the insured need 
only show that it suffered a loss to insured property. The burden of proof then 
shifts to the insurer to demonstrate that the loss is excluded.”).  
  
15 Brendan R. Vaughan, Watered Down: Are Insurance Companies Getting 
Hosed in the Wind vs. Water Controversy?, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 784 
(2008) (discussing Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 
689 (S.D. Miss. 2006)).  It is worth noting that personal property coverage in 
homeowners’ policies is often “specified peril” coverage which, although often 
covering losses “caused by windstorm or hail” does not cover losses to property 
inside a building that are caused by rain “unless the direct force of wind or hail 
damages the building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain . . . 
enters through this opening.”  Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and 
Catastrophe in the Case of Katrina and Beyond, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 49, 58 
(2006–2007). 
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by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.16  In part, the NFIP 
was a public program responding to evidence of market failure, 
the belief among private insurers that flooding was 
uninsurable––a correlated risk insurable only at sufficiently 
expensive prices as not to be sustainable in the face of adverse 
selection pressures.17  Additionally, the NFIP was also an 
experiment with publicly subsidized insurance as a regulatory 
tool, designed to reduce the escalating costs of public outlays for 
post-CAT disaster relief.18  NFIP insurance is available only to 
property owners residing in “participating communities,” with 
participation requiring state and local governments to engage in 
various levels of floodplain management.19  Communities in 
flood-prone areas that decline to participate are disqualified 
from receiving various grants administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”).20  Historically, 
NFIP policies were made available to eligible property owners at 
rates less—and in some cases, far less—than actuarially-based 
rates.21 
                                                   
16 National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4027 (2012).  
 
17 See, e.g., Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and 
Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 7 (2006–2007) 
(“[Flood insurance] suffers from unusual demand––and supply-side 
constraints that make it a relatively difficult market for insurers, and they have 
responded rationally by avoiding it.”). 
 
18 Id. at 12 (“NFIP-backed insurance was conceived of as a way of inducing 
communities to adopt flood mitigation policies that the federal government . . . 
could not compel.”).  
  
19 Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax 
System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 8 (2011–2012) 
(“Even today, individuals are not able to participate in the NFIP unless their 
communities agree to abide by various regulations intended to mitigate flood 
loss.”).  
  
20 Sandra Leon & Sandy Lubin, FEMA: Federal Disaster Relief, 17 A.B.A. 
GEN. PRACTICE, SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV. MAGAZINE 5 (2000) (stating that non-
participating communities are ineligible for FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation 
Grant Program as well as FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program).   
  
21 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-606T, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 7 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/81980.pdf.   
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To a large extent, the water exclusion, and subsequent wind-
versus-water disputes, would not be as salient if people 
purchased below-cost NFIP flood insurance to complement their 
all-peril homeowners’ coverage.  But, they don’t.  Even though 
Congress, in 1973, required flood insurance as a condition for 
federal home loans,22 there are widely varying estimates of NFIP 
market penetration.  At the most optimistic, one study suggests 
a national compliance rate of 75–80%,23 whereas other evidence 
indicates that, in Louisiana, in areas most severely affected by 
Hurricane Katrina, only 30% had flood insurance.24  Other 
studies suggest that, of 60,196 homes with severe wind damage 
from hurricanes in 2005, 38% did not have insurance against 
wind loss.25  Furthermore, regardless of which type of insurance 
was missing, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development “reported that 41 percent of damaged homes from 
the 2005 hurricanes were uninsured or underinsured.”26  When 
CAT storms involve both high winds and flooding, insureds 
suffering storm losses will almost always seek coverage from 
whatever policies they have in place.  And, with evidence 
sometimes arising of sharp dealing by insurers, many view 
wind-versus-water exclusions merely as arbitrary 
                                                   
22 42 U.S.C. § 4002(b)(4) (2013).  
 
23 LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET 
PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvii (2006).  This 
result is roughly consistent with evidence that of the thousands of homes in 
Louisiana impacted by Hurricane Katrina, 64.4% were covered by flood 
insurance.  Meg Green, Not Business As Usual, BEST’S REV. 28 (June 2006).  
  
24 James A. Knox, Jr., Causation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 901, 911 (2006);  see also Amanda Ripley, Floods, 
Tornadoes, Hurricanes, Wildfires, Earthquakes . . . Why We Don’t Prepare, 
TIME, Aug. 20, 2006, at 58 (noting that, nationally, only about 20% of 
homeowners living in flood-prone areas purchase flood insurance).   
 
25 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-7, NATURAL DISASTERS: 
PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATURAL 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 25 (2007).   
 
26 See DWIGHT JAFFEE ET AL., Long Term Insurance (LTI) for Addressing 
Catastrophe Risk 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14210, 
2008).  
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technicalities.27  As a general matter, however, exclusions for 
flood losses in all-risk homeowners’ policies are valid, 
enforceable provisions.   
B. “WIND-VERSUS-WATER” AND THE RISE OF ANTI-
CONCURRENT-CAUSE LITIGATION  
Precisely because CAT storms so frequently involve high 
winds, driving rain, and flooding, the possibility of losses from 
multiple causes often characterize CAT insurance disputes, 
playing a special role in further fragmenting the insurance-
coverage landscape.  Absent countervailing policy language, the 
most common interpretive approach to multiple-causation 
issues is the “efficient proximate cause” (“EPC”) doctrine.28  
Generally speaking, EPC searches for the “predominant” or 
“prime” or “moving” cause of the loss29 and, if not an excluded 
cause, can find coverage even if an excluded cause played some 
(secondary) role, a pro-insured interpretation most frequently 
referenced as the “concurrent cause” doctrine.30  Additionally, 
insurers in some jurisdictions include coverage for “ensuing 
losses” that occur after an otherwise excluded event, such as 
                                                   
27 See Richmond, supra note 15, at n.67 (relating unverified, but published, 
allegations from State Farm employees that supervisors at the insurer pressured 
outside engineers to alter reports so that it appeared that homeowners’ damages 
were caused by water rather than wind).  
  
28 See, e.g., Jacqueline Young, Efficient Proximate Cause: Is California 
Headed for a Katrina-Scale Disaster in the Same Leaky Boat?, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 757, 760 n.8 (2011) (citing Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen. Concurrent 
Causation Versus Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party Property Insurance 
Coverage Analysis, 36 Brief 32, 33, 35–9 (Winter 2007) (“At least thirty-five 
states employ some version of the EPC doctrine . . . .”)).   
 
29 See Young, supra note 28, at 760 (“Depending upon the jurisdiction, the 
EPC might be defined as the ‘predominant’ or most important cause in the 
chain of events, or alternatively, as the ‘prime’ or ‘moving’ cause of the loss: the 
cause that ‘set the chain of events in motion.’”). 
 
30 See Mark M. Bell, A Concurrent Mess and a Call for Clarity in First-
Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 73, 76 (2011–
2012) (“Under the pro-policyholder approach, if multiple perils combine to 
create a loss, the full amount of the loss is covered, so long as part of the loss 
was caused, even if insignificantly, by a covered cause . . . referred to by courts 
as the ‘concurrent causation’ doctrine or approach.”).  
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fires that occur following earthquakes.31  Moreover, there are 
meaningful differences among many EPC jurisdictions, 
including some jurisdictions that experiment with 
apportionment of losses,32 leading to considerable uncertainty 
in coverage.33  The result is that following CAT storm events, 
often with tens of thousands of property losses, both insureds 
and insurers face the risk of judicial decisions at odds with the 
contracts into which they believed themselves to be parties.34   
To contract around this uncertainty, insurers insert into all-
risk property insurance anti-concurrent-cause (“ACC”) clauses.  
There are two principal variations.  The first, Insurance Services 
Office (“ISO”) clause, provides: 
1.   We do not cover loss to any property resulting 
directly or indirectly from any of the following.  
Such a loss is excluded even if another peril or 
event contributed concurrently or in any sequence 
to cause the loss . . .  
(b) Water or damage caused by water-borne 
material.  Loss resulting from water or water-
borne material damage described below is not 
covered even if other perils contributed, directly or 
                                                   
31 See, e.g., Estate of Konell v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-955-
ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101081, at *8 (D. Or. July 19, 2013).  The court found 
possible coverage under an “ensuing loss” clause despite role played in loss by 
the discharge of pollutants, an excluded cause).  Id. at *14.  See also Christopher 
C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and 
Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 
215, 217 (2012) (describing adoption in some jurisdictions of policies covering 
“ensuing” losses that occur even after an excluded event, such as loss due to fire 
occurring after an earthquake).  
  
32 See Bell, supra note 30, at 80 (citing Wallis v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n,, 2 
S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (putting burden of proof on insured 
regarding which portion of loss is covered)). 
 
33 Bell, supra note 30, at 74–75 ([“The] resultant patchwork has operated to 
deprive policyholders of their reasonable expectations and has prevented 
insurers from maintaining contract certainty when drafting insurance 
policies.”).  
 
34 Id. 
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indirectly, to cause the loss.  Water and water-
borne material damages means: 
(1)  flood, surface water, waves, tidal waves, 
overflow of a body of water, spray from these, 
whether or not driven by the wind.35   
An even stricter version, developed by State Farm, provides: 
2.   We do not insure under any coverage for any 
loss which would not have occurred in the absence 
of one or more of the following excluded events.  
We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) 
the cause of the excluded event; or (b) other causes 
of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted 
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded 
event to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event 
occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or 
widespread damage, arises from natural or 
external forces, or occurs as a result of any 
combination of these . . . 
c.  Water Damage, meaning 
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, 
tsunami, seiche, overflow of a body of water, or 
spray from any of these, all whether driven by 
wind or not.36 
In two claims arising out of Hurricane Katrina, Judge Senter 
of the Southern District of Mississippi found both types of ACC 
clauses ambiguous and unenforceable.  In Leonard v. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 37 involving the 
                                                   
35 Young, supra note 28, at 762–63 (citing Tim Ryles, ‘Anticoncurrent 
Causation’ Refined by Mississippi Supreme Court, IRMI (April 2010), 
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2010/ryles04-personal-lines-
insurance.aspx 
 
36 Young, supra note 28, at 763 (citing Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 507 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2007)).   
 
37 Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 
2006). 
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narrower ISO clause, Judge Senter found the language 
ambiguous because, read with the coverage grant for wind, it 
would literally exclude any damage caused by wind where there 
was also involved even de minimis concurrent water damage.38  
In Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,39 involving the 
stricter State Farm clause, Judge Senter similarly struck down 
the ACC clause as otherwise it would deny coverage for wind 
losses that would not have occurred “but for” water damage, 
even where plaintiffs could prove that their loss was proximately 
caused by wind.40   
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed both of the district 
court’s ACC holdings.41  In Leonard, the Court of Appeals made 
an “Erie guess” that Mississippi follows the EPC doctrine as its 
default common-law rule, but that Mississippi law does not 
                                                                                                                        
 
38 Id. at 694. The court reasoned: 
 
When the policy is read as a whole, I find that this 
exclusionary provision is ambiguous . . . [t]he most 
reasonable interpretation for these conflicting policy 
provisions is that this policy provides coverage for 
windstorm damage . . . and that coverage is not negated 
merely because an excluded peril . . . occurs at or near the 
same time.  
  
Id. 
 
39 Tuepkar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05-cv-559, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34710 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006). 
 
40 Id. at *13–14. The court opined: 
 
To the extent that plaintiffs can prove their allegations that 
the hurricane winds . . . and rains entering the insured 
premises through openings caused by the hurricane winds 
proximately caused damage to their insured property, those 
losses will be covered under the policy, and this will be the 
case even if flood damage, which is not covered, 
subsequently or simultaneously occurred.  
  
Id. 
 
41 Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2007).  
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forbid the use of ACC clauses to contract around the rule.42  In 
Tuepker, the Fifth Circuit similarly found the ACC clause to be 
un-ambiguous, enforceable, and to have effectively overruled 
the EPC doctrine in Mississippi.43   
Two years later, however, in Corban v. United Services 
Automobile Association,44 the Mississippi Supreme Court held 
that ACC clauses would only apply when wind and water losses 
were “truly concurrent,” when wind and flood “simultaneously 
converg[e] and operat[e] in conjunction to damage the property 
. . . .”45 But where wind loss can be proven to have occurred first, 
followed by water loss, the insured must be covered for any loss 
proven to have been caused by wind.46  In short, the law in 
                                                   
42 Leonard, 499 F.3d at 436. The court reasoned: 
 
[T]he judicial elevation of the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine to a rule of contract construction after contrary 
policies had been approved by the state insurance 
commissioner would essentially usurp the legislature’s 
authority . . . it seems most likely that the Mississippi 
Supreme Court would regard insurance policy regulation as a 
matter better suited for the Legislature to address rather 
than the state judiciary. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).   
 
43 Tuepker, 507 F.3d at 354 (“Leonard governs this case, and compels the 
conclusion that the ACC Clause in State Farm’s policy is not ambiguous, and 
should be enforced under Mississippi law.”).  
  
44 Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601 (Miss. 2009).   
 
45 Id. at 618. 
 
46 See Jennifer McNair, The Winds of Change: The Mississippi Supreme 
Court Examines Concurrent Causation in Hurricane Katrina Claims, 30 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 579, 600 (2012). McNair suggests: 
 
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not merely disagree with 
the Fifth Circuit’s ”Erie guess,” it provided the reasoning 
behind its disagreement.  The ACC clause was not simply 
declared ambiguous or inapplicable as a whole; rather, the 
court explained when it could operate to exclude losses 
caused by truly concurrent causes and what portion of the 
provision was subject to divergent meanings and, 
consequently, ambiguous. 
 
Id. 
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Mississippi––and many other jurisdictions––still allows for 
considerable litigation over whether wind or water caused 
losses, even in first-party all-risk policies that exclude water 
loss––a state of affairs, the Court observed, that would as a 
practical matter tend to work against the party who bore the 
burden of proof.47 
C.  SOME OFTEN-OVERLOOKED MECHANISMS FOR 
FRAGMENTING CAT STORM RISK ONTO THIRD-PARTIES 
AND THIRD-PARTY FINANCIAL POOLS 
Before discussing other ways in which first-party CAT 
property insurance can be further segmented, it is worth 
observing that there may also be room for leakage of CAT storm 
losses into third-party insurance pools, and possibly also into 
general United States treasury funds via constitutional takings 
claims.  Consider, first, tort claims by those suffering CAT losses 
against various entities whose activities may be alleged to have 
contributed to those losses.  Local governments and utilities, 
when involved with flood-control activity, may be liable for the 
negligent design, maintenance, and operation of flood-control 
structures.  In Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co.,48 the Ninth 
Circuit found that a utility’s undertaking of flood-control 
measures established a common-law duty toward those 
downstream and created a duty to control floods.49  More 
recently, the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Agency-East 
announced plans to sue dozens of energy companies for cutting 
oil and gas access canals in the coastal wetlands surrounding 
New Orleans, alleging that these actions constituted negligence 
and/or nuisances in light of the role wetlands play in buffering 
the effects of hurricane storm surges.50  As to the federal 
                                                                                                                        
 
47 Corbin, 20 So.3d at 618–19.   
48 Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975).  
  
49 Id. at 504.  
 
50 See John Schwartz, Louisiana Agency Sues Dozens of Energy 
Companies for Damage to Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2013, at A13, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/louisiana-agency-to-
sue-energy-companies-for-wetland-damage.html?_r=0.  
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government, although the result is now seriously in doubt, New 
Orleans residents, businesses, and local governments sued the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for flood-related damages 
estimated at $20 billion for the Corps’ alleged failure to 
maintain the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet.51  Although the 
federal government generally enjoys immunity from damages 
caused by floodwaters released in the course of flood-control 
activities, even if negligently done,52 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held, in December 2012, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission 
v. United States,53 that the federal government might be liable 
under the Takings Clause to downstream landowners for 
government-induced flooding that rises to the level of a 
temporary or permanent occupation of plaintiffs’ riparian 
property.54  
                                                   
51 On September 24, 2012, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
granted a petition for panel rehearing, and withdrew an earlier opinion 
upholding a district court’s ruling that had imposed this multi-billion dollar 
liability.  In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 441, 454 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (despite government’s role in MRGO not involving ”flood control 
activities”).  The case is awaiting further decision by the entire Fifth Circuit on 
the ground of general federal government immunity for discretionary decisions.  
This recent reversal, as to the federal government’s third-party liability did not 
directly affect a parallel lawsuit, against the Washington Group (and its liability 
insurers), a private contractor alleged to have dug holes in the Industrial Canal 
as part of a lock replacement project, which began trial proceedings in 
September 2012.  However, in April 2013, the district court in that case issued a 
judgment for the government and its contractor.  See In re Katrina Canal 
Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53802 (E.D. La. Apr. 
12, 2013).  
 
52 See Cent. Green Co. v United States, 531 U.S. 425, 426–27 (2001). 
 
53 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
 
54 Id. at 522; see generally Magdalene Carter, Flooding the Possibility of 
Recovery Under a Temporary Takings Analysis: The Drowning Effects of 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 23 Vill. Envt’l. L.J. 211 
(2012) (discussing ramifications of Unites States Court of Appeals for Federal 
Circuit decisions in the case).   
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D.  THE HOLLOWING OUT OF PRIVATE CAT WIND 
COVERAGE           
Even if we restrict analysis to the fragmentation of first-party 
CAT storm coverage, and set aside all wind-water ambiguities, 
in recent years there has evolved an unmistakable pattern in 
private all-peril policies, at least as regards coverage for CAT 
wind.  The trend is toward increased self-insurance for first-
dollar losses, and increased use of excess insurance for last-
dollar coverage.55  At best, private insurers are increasingly 
offering only hollowed-out CAT wind coverage.56  At worst, 
private insurers are now exiting markets for CAT wind coverage 
as surely as they exited markets for CAT flood insurance in the 
1960’s.57  In their place, there have emerged state-run residual 
risk wind pools that are increasingly doing for CAT wind what 
FEMA did, historically, for CAT flood – making insurance 
available at below-market rates.58   
It is hard to understate the effect catastrophes have had on 
insurers within the past forty years.  As Jaffee, Kunreuther, and 
Michel-Kerjan stated in 2008, “[b]etween 1970 and the mid-
1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters (including 
                                                   
55 See Hurricane Irene Likely to Strike East Coast: Do You Know What 
Your Hurricane Deductible Is?, INS. INFO. INST. (Aug. 25, 2011), available at 
www.iii.org/press-releases/hurricane-irene-likely-to-strike-east-coast-do-you-
know-what-your-hurricane-deductible-is.html ("In some coastal areas with high 
wind risk, insurers may incorporate hurricane deductibles even higher than 5 
percent); Coastal Property Insurance, COCHRAN INS. AGENCY, 
www.coastalpropertyinsurance.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("Excess 
coverage now available in North Carolina . . . the North Carolina Beach Plan will 
only be responsible on ‘primary’ up to $750,000"). 
 
56 See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter, The Insurance Industry's Incredible 
Disappearing Weather Catastrophe Risk: How Insurers Have Shifted Risk 
and Cost Associated with Weather Catastrophes to Consumers and Taxpayers, 
CONSUMER FED’N. OF AM. 1 (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/InsuranceRegulationHurricaneRiskDisappe
aringCoverageStudy2-12.pdf (insurer savings "have been achieved by hallowing 
out coverage in homeowners’ insurance policies and raising rates."). 
 
57 Id. ("[I]ndustry data demonstrates that insurers have significantly and 
methodically decreased their financial responsibility for those events in past 
years and shifted much of this risk to consumers and taxpayers."). 
 
58 Id. 
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forest fires) were in the $3 to $4 billion range. . . . total losses 
paid by private insurers due to major natural catastrophes were 
$87 billion in 2005.”59  To some extent, the overall increase and 
volatility of year-to-year CAT losses may reflect early signs of the 
gradual effects of climate change on CAT risks, including long-
term changes to the frequency and severity of storms.60  But, 
equally important to insurers are worst-case risks that can swing 
wildly from year-to-year, exposing insurers to solvency risks.  In 
1992, Hurricane Andrew led to the bankruptcy of ten Florida 
insurers, and imperiled the Florida Insurance Guaranty 
Association.61  In 2006, six years before Superstorm Sandy, 
some prognosticators predicted “a northeastern hurricane twice 
as costly as Katrina that could devastate the New York boroughs 
of Brooklyn and Manhattan and submerge nearby parts of New 
Jersey.”62  Concerned about just such worst-case scenarios, 
private risk-rating agencies such as AIR International (“AIR”) 
and Risk Management Solutions (“RMS”), employ proprietary 
risk models that are notorious for changing overnight, such as a 
2011 RMS Model that increased hurricane risks almost 
overnight by 150 percent, attacked by its critics for in essence 
making Ohio a coastal state.63  Of course, in October 2012, the 
                                                   
59 JAFFE ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.   
 
60 See Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE 1040, 
1040–41 (2005) (insurance is the world’s foremost integrator of climate-related 
impacts); see also Jeff Masters, 2011’s Billion-Dollar Disasters: Is Climate 
Change to Blame?, 65 WEATHERWISE 12, 15 (2012) (discussing the possibility 
that climate change has led to greater CAT losses and the potential financial 
impact of recent incremental weather changes on losses);  see also Laurens M. 
Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate 
Change?, 92 AMER. METEOR. SOC. 39, 41–42 (2011) (22 studies show an increase 
in disaster losses in recent decades, although 14 of them accredit conflating 
factors, including wealth/population increases in areas of weather-related risk).  
  
61 Richmond, supra note 15, at 53.  
  
62 Id. at 50. (citing Amanda Riply, Why We Don’t Prepare for Disaster, 
TIME, Aug 28, 2006, at 54, 57 (“a serious hurricane is due to strike New York 
City, just as one did in 1821 and 1938)).  
    
63 See Chad Hemenway, Cat Modeling: Ingrained in the Industry, 
Embroiled in Controversy, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (Mar. 21, 2011), available 
at http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/03/18/cat-modeling-ingrained-
in-the-industry-embroiled-i.  
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path of Superstorm Sandy eerily fulfilled both of these 
predictions, even to the point of bringing unprecedented storm 
damage to Ohio after making its infamous “left turn” at New 
Jersey and heading inland.64   In addition to outright solvency 
concerns, insurers worry about these volatile models because of 
their influence on rating agencies such as A.M. Best, Fitch, and 
Standard & Poor’s because ratings from these agencies affect the 
ability of insurers to attract customers and capital.65   
Rational CAT insurers hardly need to wait for resolution of 
the scientific debate over climate change, or to subject 
themselves fully to the volatility of risk models.  Because most 
property insurance is marketed on a year-to-year basis, insurers 
respond to underwriting uncertainties fairly quickly; the most 
obvious response is to seek rate increases to hedge the worst-
case prospects of unexpectedly high losses.  Between 2001 and 
2006, rates for homeowners’ insurance in Florida rose 77%, in 
Louisiana 65%, and in South Carolina 56%.66  But, depending on 
state-by-state procedures for rate increases, it is at this point 
that connections between weather catastrophes and insurance 
                                                   
64 See Karen Farkas, Superstorm Sandy Aftermath Leaves Northeast Ohio 
Powerless and Busy Cleaning Up, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index/ssf/2012/10/superstorm_sandy_after
math_lea.html.   
 
65 See, e.g., IL. DEPT. OF INS., FINDING A REPUTABLE INSURANCE COMPANY: 
USING FINANCIAL RATING AGENCIES, 
http://insurance.illinois.gov/General/find_reputable.asp (last revised June 
2009); see also Karen Clark, How Can Rating Agencies Better Gauge Carrier 
Cat-Risk Exposure?, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (May 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/05/16/how-can-rating-agencies-
better-gauge-carrier-cat-.  
  
66 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, BLOWN AWAY: HOW GLOBAL 
INSURANCE IS ERODING THE AVAILABILITY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA’S 
COASTAL CITIES v-viii (2007), available at 
http://emerginglitigation.shb.com/Portals/f81bfc4f-cc59-46fe-9ed5-
7795e6eea5b5/7301_BlownAway_insurancereport.pdf;  see also, Associated 
Press, Customers Cry Foul as Homeowner Insurance Costs Jump, Especially in 
Hurricane Areas, THE OREGONIAN (May 31, 2013), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2013/05/customers_cry_foul_as
_homeowne.html  (“Nationwide, the cost of homeowners’ insurance rose 36 
percent from 2003 to 2010—almost double the rate of inflation . . . [r]ates in 
Florida rose 91 percent, most in the nation, while rates in Rhode Island went up 
62 percent.”). 
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pivot into public law and the politics of coverage.  Next, a second 
pivotal point begins when insurers do not get regulatory 
approval for all of the rate increases they seek.  When this 
happens, insurers employ several mechanisms to limit their 
exposure to CAT risks: they simply stop writing insurance within 
a state’s high-risk areas,67 they sharply limit the maximum 
amounts of insurance they are prepared to offer any individual 
insured,68 and/or they force insureds to bear a greater 
proportion of losses through higher deductibles or co-
payments.69  
The overall effect of these market mechanisms is to create an 
insurance landscape of increasingly hollowed-out coverage, in 
which even those who can afford insurance are paying more for 
less, effectively being forced to self-insure ever-larger amounts 
of their own risk.  The increasing retention of CAT-related risks 
by insureds is notable.  In Florida, when an unprecedented 
sequence of four hurricanes swept the state in 2004, those who 
had insurance nevertheless bore 15–20% of the financial 
losses.70  In North Carolina, legislation adopted in 2009 capped 
the maximum policy limit that the state’s residual wind pool 
could offer homeowners for dwellings and structures at 
$750,000.71   
                                                   
67 See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, supra note 66, at 17 (“Allstate, which has 
dropped approximately 320,000 policies since 2004 in Florida, is no longer 
writing new coverage anywhere in the state.”).  In 2008, coastal homeowners’ 
coverage in North Carolina became a public policy issue when Farmers 
Insurance decided to withdraw from property insurance statewide rather than 
participate in what it believed to be a system of actuarially unfair rates and post-
event assessments for shortfalls.  See Brian H. Kern, Farmers Insurance to Pull 
Out of North Carolina Homeowners' Market, INS. JOURNAL (Aug. 14, 2008), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2008/08/14/92787.htm 
(‘“Farmers regrets having to non-renew our homeowners customers, but the 
current hurricane assessment process has forced us to make this difficult 
business decision”’).  
 
68 See EVAN MILLS ET AL., AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF INSURANCE 
UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. 2 (2005). 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 Id.  
  
71 See H.B. 1305, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.C. 2009), available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2009/Bills/House/PDF/H1305v7.pdf.  The 
$750,000 policy limit is found in Section 58-45-41: Coverage Limits.   
Fall 2013 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 11:1 
27 
This is not to say that insurers, in what remains of the 
private market for coastal CAT insurance, which are primarily 
wind losses, are behaving irrationally, at least in the corporate 
world in which they must remain cognizant of their ability to 
attract investment capital.  But it is to say that there is more to 
the story than the common scenario put forth by CAT insurers 
when seeking rate increases, namely that any profits they show 
in the “good” years––meaning the is weather relatively quiet––
is more than offset in the catastrophic years.  Rather, by a 
combination of increased revenue through higher premiums, 
often based on CAT models justifying higher rates than 
historical models, hollowing out their risk exposure, and the 
purchasing of reinsurance or other financial instruments to limit 
their losses in the event of worst-case scenarios, those dwindling 
property/casualty insurers that remain in the business 
increasingly shed risks to the point that they can sometimes 
enjoy less investment risk than the market in general.  Robert 
Hunter explains: 
[The risk of a stock is] shown in any Value Line 
publication, which tests the risk of a stock.  One 
key measure is the stock’s Beta, which is the 
sensitivity of a stock’s returns to the returns on 
some market index, such as the Standard & Poor’s 
500.  A Beta between 0 and 1, such as utility 
stocks, is a low-volatility investment.  A Beta equal 
to 1 matches the index.  A Beta greater than 1 is 
anything more volatile than the index, such as a 
“small cap” fund.  
 
Consider Allstate. At the same time the company has taken 
draconian steps to sharply raise premiums and/or reduce 
coverage for many homeowners in coastal areas, it has 
presented shareholders with very low risk: Beta = 0.90 . . . .72 
 
                                                   
72 Additional Perspectives on the Need for Insurance Regulatory Reform, 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored 
Enterprises, Of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 14 (2007) (statement of 
J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins., Consumer Fed’n of Am.). 
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Although plainly, as the “global aggregator” of climate-
related losses, insurers can be drastically affected financially 
when weather catastrophes occur, it is precisely for this reason 
that insurers have, and will continue to, rationally take steps not 
to be on the bleeding edge of these financial effects.  Private 
insurers in the twenty-first century are in the process of exiting 
CAT wind markets, just as they exited CAT flood markets in the 
twentieth century.   
E.  THE EMERGENCE OF STATE RESIDUAL RISK POOLS FOR 
CAT WIND COVERAGE           
To fill the void, states in the southeast and gulf-coast region 
of the United States are increasingly relying on public or quasi-
public residual risk pools for wind insurance, much like the 
federal government created the NFIP as a national high-risk 
pool for flood insurance forty-five years ago.  In 2002, Florida 
created the Citizens Property Corporation.73  In 2003, Louisiana 
created the Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Association.74  
Texas has created the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association,75 
Mississippi the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting 
Association,76 and Alabama its “Beach Pool.”77  These plans and 
others typically reflect the structure of residual high-risk 
insurance entities in which the state conditions the right to sell 
insurance within the state with forced participation in its Fair 
Access to Insurance Requirement (“FAIR”) plans.  For purposes 
                                                   
73 See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6) (2002), available at 
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubM
enu=1&App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=627.351&URL=CH0627/
Sec351.HTM.  
  
74 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2293 (2003), available at 
http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?d=509389.   
 
75 See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 2210.01 (West 2007), available at 
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/IN/htm/IN.2210.htm. 
 
76 See MISS. STAT. ANN. § 83-34-3 (2007), available at 
http://statutes.laws.com/mississippi/title-83/34/83-34-3.   
 
77  See ALA. CODE § 27-1-24 (2009), available at 
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginMac.asp.  The full name 
for the risk pool is the Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association.  Id.  
 
Fall 2013 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 11:1 
29 
of this article, I will assume the constitutionality of this public 
policy movement.78  Typically, state wind pools are created as 
“insurers of last resort” for homeowners who cannot find 
affordable––or any––private CAT coverage.79 What is 
unmistakable is that these entities have become the fastest 
growing mechanism by which coastal homeowners obtain CAT 
wind insurance.  Compared to approximately $55 billion in 
exposure to loss in 1990, state-run FAIR plans had, by 2007, 
become exposed to over $500 billion in potential losses.80  By 
2007, Florida’s Citizens program had become Florida’s largest 
property insurer of first resort81 and the fourth-largest property 
insurer outright in the nation.82  North Carolina’s “Beach Plan” 
currently insures approximately 75% of the residential wind risk 
                                                   
78 There are, of course, those who question the constitutionality of these 
arrangements.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance 
Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 298 
(1999).  
  
79 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(b) (2012). 
 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the rates for coverage 
provided by the association be actuarially sound and not 
competitive with approved rates charged in the admitted 
voluntary market such that the association functions as a 
residual market mechanism to provide insurance only when 
the insurance cannot be procured in the voluntary market. 
 
80 See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, supra note 66, at 8.   
 
81 See Jean Gross, The Insurer of First Resort, BUS. OBSERVER FL (Jan. 20, 
2011), http://www.businessobserverfl.com/section/detail/the-insurer-of-first-
resort/ ("When it was created after Andres, Citizens was supposed to be the 
insurer of last resort . . . [t]oday, the state-owned agency has become the largest 
residential property insurer in Florida . . . ."). 
 
82 Tom Zucco & Jennifer Liberto, Citizens’ Business Booms, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (June 26, 2007), 
http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/26/Business/Citizens__business_bo.shtml 
(“Citizens currently has about 1.3-million homeowner policies, and its 
commercial business is growing by 1,000 percent this year.  That makes Citizens 
the fourth-largest property insurer in the nation.”).   
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on North Carolina’s famous Outer Banks and other barrier 
islands.83   
II. THE FUTURE OF CAT FLOOD AND CAT WIND 
COVERAGE 
A.  JULY 2012: A SEA CHANGE IN THE NFIP AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF CAT FLOOD COVERAGE 
That Congress, and in particular this Congress, enacted 
sweeping changes to the NFIP in the summer of an election 
year, deserves special note.  Although I leave a full recounting of 
this remarkable political event for another time, suffice it to note 
that on July 6, 2012, President Obama signed into law the 
“Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012,”84 
certainly the most significant revision to the NFIP in twenty 
years.85  Among its short-term achievements, it authorized 
funding for the NFIP over the next five years,86 against a 
backdrop of dozens of disruptive, short-term extensions of the 
NFIP program over the last few years that were reminiscent, on 
this small stage, of the current Congress’ use of precisely such 
short-term funding extensions in larger budget battles with the 
White House.  In short, Biggert-Waters was a significant, and 
almost completely overlooked, sign of political cooperation over 
a significant budgetary matter.  And the bipartisan support it 
drew, in particular in its elimination of the NFIP’s tradition of 
subsidizing below-cost flood insurance, laid down the 
groundwork for the unusual bipartisan political configurations 
                                                   
83 Email from Gin Schwitzgebel, Gen. Manager, N.C. Joint Underwriting 
Ass’n, to Donald T. Hornstein, Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C. 
Sch. of Law. (Nov. 11, 2013) (on file with author).  
 
84 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
126 Stat. 916 (2012) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129). 
   
85 See Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartersafer.org and the Biggert-
Waters Act of 2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2013) (“The Biggert-
Waters Act may well be the largest revamping of the flood insurance program 
since its origin in 1968.”).   
 
86 Id. at 353.   
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that emerged in January 2013 when Congress, over significant 
objections from fiscal conservatives, enacted the $50.5 billion 
package for Superstorm Sandy relief.87  
Although I want to highlight mostly the Act’s central 
contribution toward eliminating the subsidized nature of NFIP 
flood insurance, one of its less noticed provisions is especially 
germane to the subject of fragmented risk and, in particular, to 
the “wind-versus water” elements of CAT storm coverage.  A 
part of the Act included provisions of a parallel bill, the 
“Consumer Option for an Alternative System to Allocate Losses 
(“COASTAL”) Act of 2012, which had been introduced.88  Under 
its COASTAL Act provisions, Biggert-Waters requires FEMA to 
develop for “named” storms a post-assessment protocol and 
database for the purpose of creating a system for allocating 
losses among wind and water perils.89  Work under this 
delegated authority has barely begun, but it may be expected to 
parallel developments in CAT storm insurance that have 
emerged among private reinsurers and international CAT storm 
efforts involving “parametric insurance,” which trigger coverage 
based on such macro-features as wind-speed at particular 
measuring locations rather than ex-post micro determinations 
of particular losses to determine whether wind or water caused 
the loss.90  In the short term, it is also noteworthy that Biggert-
Waters requires FEMA, at a state’s request, to participate in 
                                                   
87 See Brett Logiurato, The House Has Passed More than $50 Billion in 
Sandy Aid, Despite Heavy Republican Opposition, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 15, 
2013, 7:37 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sandy-relief-bill-vote-pork-
congress-conservatives-2013-1.   
 
88 Consumer Option for an Alternative System to Allocate Losses Act of 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100251, 126 Stat. 969 (2012).  
  
89 Id. at § 100252.  
  
90 For background information on parametric insurance coverage, including 
its use in the much-touted Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, see 
generally Lauren Brooks, The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility: 
Parametric Insurance Payouts Without Proper Parameters, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 135 (2012). 
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state-sponsored non-binding mediations to resolve insurance 
claims disputes.91 
The principal change enacted by Biggert-Waters, however, is 
to mark the beginning of the end for NFIP’s historically below-
market insurance rates for flood insurance.  The Act requires 
premium rate adjustments for any property located within an 
NFIP-participating area to reflect the property location’s current 
risk of flooding and to take effect upon the “effective date” of any 
revised or updated flood insurance rate maps.92  New properties 
insured under the NFIP––those not currently covered––must 
be based on “actuarial rates.”93  Rates for homes currently 
insured under the NFIP are allowed to rise by 20% annually, 
over a five-year period, until their rates also reflect the 
“actuarial” risk.94  Special subsidies that in the past were given 
                                                   
91 For background information on disaster mediation programs, see 
generally Bobby Marzine Harges, Disaster Mediation Programs -- Ensuring 
Fairness and Quality for Minority Participants, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 893 (2011).   
 
92 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100207, 126 Stat. 919 (codified at amended 42 
U.S.C. 4015 (2012)) (“[A]ny property located in an area that is participating in 
the national flood insurance program shall have the risk premium rate charged 
for flood insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the current 
risk of flood to such property, subject to any other provision of this Act.”).  Since 
its enactment, however, there have been numerous efforts to repeal or delay 
implementation of coastal rate hikes.  Senator Mary Landrieu (D-La) has 
worked especially hard to stall rate increases.  See Arthur D. Postal, Louisiana 
Senators Push for Delay in NFIP Rate Hikes, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (May 8, 
2013), available at 
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/05/08/louisiana-senators-push-
for-delay-in-nfip-rate-hik.  See also Evan Lehmann, Coastal Lawmakers, 
Fearing Rate Hikes, Cross Party Lines to Keep Flood Insurance Subsidies, E&E 
PUBLISHING, LLC (June 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059982464.  
  
93 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205, 126 Stat. 919 (2012).   
 
94 Id. at § 100207  
 
Any increase in the risk premium rate charged for flood 
insurance on any property that is covered by a flood 
insurance policy on the effective date of such an update that 
is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5-year 
period, at the rate of 20 percent for each year following such 
effective date.  
  
Id. 
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to second homes, business properties, severe repetitive loss 
properties, or substantially improved/damaged properties, are 
to be phased out entirely, with rates for such properties to 
increase by 25% per year until premiums meet the “full actuarial 
cost.”95  Prior to FEMA’s development of these updated rate 
maps, the Act establishes new, minimum property deductibles 
of $1,500 for properties insured for $100,000 or less96 and 
$2,000 for properties insured beyond $100,000,97 up to the 
NFIP maximum of $250,000.98  Following development of the 
updated FEMA rate maps, the deductibles will moderate 
marginally.   
As these premium increases are tied to FEMA’s notoriously 
slow flood-mapping capabilities, it is significant that Biggert-
Waters allocates $400 million annually to FEMA’s national 
flood mapping program.99  The Act requires maps for all areas 
within 100-year and 500-year floodplains and “residual risk” 
areas,100 and requires that the agency use the “most accurate 
data” in their development.101  The Act also requires FEMA to 
                                                                                                                        
 
95 See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205(a), 126 Stat. 917, (codifying the 
elimination of certain special subsidies).  See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 
100205(c)(3), 126 Stat. 918-919 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 4015(e) 
(2012)) (providing specified increases). 
   
96 See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100210(b)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 921 (2012).   
 
97 Id. at § 100210(b)(1)(B).  
  
98 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100231(a)(1)(A)(i), 126 Stat. 949 (2012).  
  
99 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100216(f), 126 Stat. 927 (2012) (codified as 
amended 42 U.S.C. 4101(b)) (authority to allocate $400 million annually 
between 2013 and 2017).  
  
100 See id. at § 100216(b)(1)(A) (mandating ongoing program between 
Administrator and Technical Mapping Advisory Council to review, update, and 
maintain NFIP rate maps with respect to the 100-year floodplain, the 500-year 
floodplain, areas of residual risk, areas that could be inundated in case of failed 
flood control structures, and the level of protection provided by such 
structures).   
 
101 See id. at § 100216(b)(1)(C) (requiring the usage of “the most accurate 
topography and elevation data available” for development and publishing of any 
NFIP rate maps).  
  
Fall 2013 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 11:1 
34 
contract with the National Academy of Public Administration to 
conduct a study of inter-agency coordination between FEMA 
and both federal and state agencies over the flood-mapping 
program,102 and requires the Office of Management and Budget 
to submit a report to Congress when proposing FEMA’s annual 
budget, specifically highlighting crosscutting budget issues 
involving mapping.103  
As so many of the NFIP’s weaknesses in past years involved 
hopelessly out-of-date flood maps, inadequate budget for their 
revision, and pressure from local stakeholders on accurate map 
updating, it is significant that Biggert-Waters provides that 
appeals of FEMA mapping determinations can be based solely 
on their technical and scientific validity, and creates a Scientific 
Resolution Panel to address any mapping-related concerns 
raised by communities who are dissatisfied with the outcome of 
any appeals to FEMA.104  Although it remains to be seen where 
opportunities lay, even within this revised bureaucratic 
architecture, for political pressure and procedural delay, it is 
significant that Biggert-Waters preemptively addressed the 
issue.  
Although I will briefly address other, more long-term 
features of Biggert-Waters below, it is useful to recognize how 
updated FEMA maps, and the new NFIP premium structure, are 
already being felt on the ground.  Even prior to the Act, FEMA 
had updated maps prepared for areas on the New Jersey coast 
devastated by Superstorm Sandy.105  In mid-December 2012, 
                                                   
102 See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100221(a), 126 Stat. 933 (2012) (requiring a 
contract to form a study on how FEMA should improve coordination on 
mapping and establish joint funding across agencies and governmental units to 
promote sharing of data).  
  
103 See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100220(a)(2), 126 Stat. 933 (2012) (codified in 
amended 42 U.S.C. 4101(c)) (to display relevant sections of budget proposed for 
each federal agency working on risk determination data and digital elevation 
maps, and to describe the effects of integration).  
  
104 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100218(a), 126 Stat. 930 (2012) (establishment of Scientific Resolution 
Panel).   
 
105 See Stephen Stirling, Jersey Shore Revolution Begins, as FEMA 
Releases New Flood Maps, THE STAR-LEDGER (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:10 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/12/jersey_shore_revolution_begins.
html. 
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FEMA released some of the new advisory maps––the first 
change to New Jersey’s federal flood maps in more than two 
decades––that showed many properties that had previously 
been classified in a FEMA “A” zone to be reclassified into the 
higher-threat “V” zone.106 The effect on rebuilding options and 
the phase-in of higher NFIP flood rates can be stark.  By one 
account, if a property owner under the old maps had been 
classified in an “A” zone, but is several feet “below” a new 
reference point known as “base flood elevation,” and simply 
rebuilds––especially if the damaged house had been built on a 
“slab” and is simply rebuilt on the same type of foundation, and 
at the same elevation––the rebuilt property would be rated at 
the higher risk and would be subject, after phase in, of up to 
$31,000 in annual NFIP flood-loss premium.107  If the owner 
were to rebuild to the suggested “base flood elevation,” the 
maximum phased-in premium would be approximately $7,000 
annually.108  And if the resident were to rebuild on elevated 
structures to two feet above the base flood elevation, the annual 
phased-in NFIP premium would be closer to $3,500 annually.109  
B.  THE FUTURE OF CAT WIND OR COMBINED CAT 
WIND/FLOOD INSURANCE 
It is noteworthy that as Biggert-Waters ushered in a new 
world of increasingly restrictive and expensive NFIP coverage 
there were also nods toward more expansive possibilities.  The 
Act requires the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to 
submit a report to Congress on losses that would have been 
                                                                                                                        
 
106 See Gina Columbus, N.J. Officials Assess New Flood Maps in Sandy’s 
Wake, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:28 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/16/new-nj-flood-
maps/1773733.  
  
107 Edward Van Embden, New Jersey to Adopt FEMA’s Flood Elevation 
Maps, Christie Says, MIDDLETON PATCH (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:50 AM), 
http://middletown-nj.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/new-jersey-
to-adopt-femas-flood-elevation-maps-christie-says.   
 
108 Id. 
 
109 Stirling, supra note 105.  See also Van Emden, supra note 107.  
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incurred in the notorious 2004–2005 hurricane season had the 
program insured policyholders up to a maximum of $417,000—
far in excess of the current NFIP cap of $250,000.110  The Act 
also charged GAO, in the same report, to evaluate whether the 
Act’s phased elimination of subsidized, below-market rates for 
flood insurance can change the willingness of private insurers to 
reenter the flood-insurance market, and on whether further 
raising/lowering rates could provide the tipping point to induce 
just such a reawakening of interest in the private market.111  The 
Act separately charged GAO with reporting on whether the 
NFIP, if properly priced, could offer business interruption and 
additional-living-expenses coverage, features not now available 
through NFIP policies.112  More broadly, the Act requires the 
Director of the Federal Insurance Office to conduct a study on 
the current state of the market for general “natural catastrophe 
insurance in the United States” and submit the report to 
Congress by July 2013.113  These measures indicate the 
collection of information for even broader changes to the NFIP 
by future, budget-constrained Congresses.     
III. CONCLUSION 
In the short term, some things will remain the same.  There 
will be CAT flood and wind losses, and there will continue to be 
wind versus water disputes over coverage in particular areas.  
But, because of the NFIP amendments, it is also likely that the 
next ten years of CAT coverage will be different from the 
previous ten years.  NFIP premiums will rise and private 
insurers may reconsider entering the flood-risk market 
themselves, perhaps with cheaper options analogous to major-
medical-only coverage designed to cover only worst-case losses.  
In light of rising costs, insureds may increasingly opt for higher 
                                                   
110 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100231(a)(1)-(2), 126 Stat. 949-50 (2012).   
 
111 See id. § 100231(a)(4).   
 
112 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100233(a)(1), 126 Stat. 955 (2012).   
 
113 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100247(a), 126 Stat. 967 (2012).   
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deductibles and self-insurance to keep premiums manageable.  
All of these trends will continue to fragment the financing of 
CAT losses in the United States.   Fragmentation aside, the slow 
internalization of CAT losses by private markets and 
governmental budgets may, perhaps slowly, reinforce efforts to 
retrofit our floodplains and coasts with structures more resilient 
to storms. 
 
